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Representationalism
is the view in
philosophy and
cognitive
science that the
mind is nothing
more than a
representational
system.
According to
representationalism,
any two
creatures that
are
representationally
identical are
mentally
identical.
The chief
obstacle to
representationalism
is
consciousness.
Consciousness,
it has been
argued, resists
explanation in
representational
terms. The
philosophical
debate over
consciousness
and the
representational
theory of mind
is outlined and
the two dominant
representational
approaches to
consciousness –
first-order and
higher-order representationalism
– are examined
and shown to
have serious
problems. A
third approach –
same-order
representationalism
– is put forward
and shown to
avoid these
problems.
The issues in
the debate draw
on philosophical
arguments as
well as noted
studies in neuro-
and
developmental
psychology and
primatology.
Finally, a few
objections to
the same-order
approach are
raised and
suggestions are
provided on how
the theory could
be developed to
overcome them.
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