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I argued in my
dissertation
that the 'hard'
metaphysical
problem of free
will may be
explained in
simple,
metaphysically
'easy'
causal/functional
terms as a
product of the
mechanics of
metacognitive
mental
causation:
There seems to
be a causal
connection
between the
extent to which
the mind can "go
meta-", or loop
back in
reflectively on
its own
processes (e.g.,
think about its
thoughts, prefer
its desires,
etc.), and
self-regulation
(autonomy, free
will), evident
in sensory-motor
agility,
biofeedback, and
a host of
related
phenomena of an
equally mundane
nature.
The present
research
explores two new
directions to
this line of
thought: (1)
the extent to
which
mindfulness and
other meditation
practices
increase
self-regulation
or autonomy, and
(2) the extent
to which one may
develop a cogent
version of a
Buddhist theory
of free will
based on these
ideas.
Recent brain
research seeks
to isolate
neural pathways
connected with
negating one’s
intention just
before acting,
and related
phenomena
connected with
the idea of
autonomy, in the
hopes of
specifying the
actual circuitry
of what would be
called the
causal/functional
mechanics of
free will.
Recent
mindfulness
research seeks
to quantify the
extent to which
such things as
heightened
attentional
control co-vary
with the
quantity of
exposure to
mindfulness
meditation.
Cognitive
neuroscientists
collaborating
with the Dalai
Lama's monks
(long-term
practitioners of
mindfulness)
have discovered
that the brains
of these
meditators are
larger and more
active in the
areas
researchers
would expect to
see them as
such, based on
the assumption
that the
meditators’
introspective
self-reports
about what is
going on in
their minds were
true.
These findings
corroborate the
fact that
long-term
practitioners
have developed
greater
metacognitive
and other
introspective
abilities. I
explore the
extent to which
these abilities
may be construed
as increases in
autonomy, and
thus as
empirical
evidence in
support of a
Buddhist theory
of free will
along
metacognitive
causal/functional
lines.
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